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Abstract
We study portfolio choice when labor income and dividends are cointegrated. Economically plausible
calibrations suggest young investors should take substantial short positions in the stock market. Because
of cointegration the young agent's human capital e®ectively becomes \stock-like." However, for older
agents with shorter times-to-retirement, cointegration does not have su±cient time to act, and thus
their human capital becomes more \bond-like." Together, these e®ects create hump-shaped life-cycle
portfolio holdings, consistent with empirical observation. These results hold even when asset return
predictability is accounted for.
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The optimal portfolio choice problem over the life cycle has received considerable attention
in political, ¯nancial, and academic circles. Yet, in spite of the vast work on this topic, there is still
much disagreement across empirical observation, conventional wisdom, and the predictions of most of the
academic literature.
While the level of stock market participation has increased signi¯cantly over the decades, several
studies report that risky asset holdings have typically been low at young ages, and then either increasing
or hump-shaped over the life cycle (see, for example, Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), Faig and Shum (2002),
Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Poterba and Samwick (2001)). In contrast, conventional wisdom maintains
that for reasonable levels of risk aversion, young agents should place a large proportion of their wealth
into the market portfolio, and this proportion should decline as the agent nears retirement. Indeed, one
often-quoted strategy suggested by ¯nancial advisors is that investors should place (100 - age)% of their
wealth in a well-diversi¯ed equity portfolio (see, for example, Malkiel (1996, p. 418)).
Both empirical observation and conventional wisdom seem at odds with the academic literature. First,
early academic studies such as Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) conclude that a long-lived agent should
hold a constant fraction of her wealth in the risky asset throughout her life. Second, when calibrated to
historical values of the equity premium and stock market return volatility, as well as \reasonable" levels
of risk-aversion, these models predict that the appropriate proportion of wealth placed in the risky asset
is counterfactually large|sometimes higher than 100%. Third, these models generate little heterogeneity
in stock market participation even if there is signi¯cant variation in risk aversion across agents. These
results, however, are derived under many restrictive assumptions, including power utility, independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) returns on the risky and risk-free investments, the absence of market
frictions, and perhaps most importantly, the absence of labor income.
In an attempt to reconcile theory and observation, many of the restrictive assumptions underlying
the Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) results have been progressively relaxed.1 For instance, several
studies examine the e®ect of labor income on portfolio choice over the life cycle. For many agents, the
\wealth" (i.e., the certainty-equivalent present value) tied up in terms of future wages dwarfs their ¯nancial
wealth. As such, one might suspect that optimal portfolio choice that takes labor income into account
may generate signi¯cantly di®erent predictions. Interestingly, however, most existing studies ¯nd that
incorporating labor income into the optimal portfolio decision only serves to reinforce the puzzle. Indeed,
most models attribute \bond-like" qualities to the future °ow of labor income. That is, these models
predict that through their labor income, agents implicitly hold a large position in the risk-free asset, which
implies that they should take an even more aggressive position in the risky asset with their cash-on-hand
1Some papers in this vein examine the implications of time variation in the riskless interest rate or in the equity premium,
and/or di®erent utility functions for the portfolio choice problem. See, for example, Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Barberis
(2000), Brandt (1999), Brandt et al. (2005), Brennan et al. (1997), Brennan and Xia (2000), Campbell et al. (2004), Campbell
and Viceira (1999, 2001), Cvitani¶ c et al. (2006), Dammon et al. (2003), Guidolin and Timmermann (2006), Kandel and
Stambaugh (1996), Kim and Omberg (1996), Liu (2005), Michaelides (2003), Samuelson (1991), Schroder and Skiadas (1999),
Wachter (2002), and Xia (2001).2
compared to those models that ignore labor income. Early papers include Bodie, Merton and Samuelson
(1992, BMS), who consider portfolio choice in the context of an endogenous leisure/labor trade-o®. More
recently, a number of researchers employ micro data to calibrate the individual labor income process.
(See, for example, Campbell et al. (2001, CCGM), Cocco, Gomez, and Maenhout (2005, CGM), Davis
and Willen (2000), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996), and Viceira
(2001)).2 With the particular distributional assumptions made in those papers (essentially, labor income
and stock returns follow autonomous Markov i.i.d. or AR(1) processes), they ¯nd that only counterfactually
high correlations between shocks to labor income and stock returns, or the possibility of disastrous labor
income shocks (see, for example, CGM), can explain young investors' low holdings of the risky asset.
Note, however, that the labor income speci¯cation in these models may be unnecessarily restrictive.
In particular, if the contemporaneous correlation ½RM ;L between market returns and changes to aggregate
labor income °ow is speci¯ed to be low (consistent with the data), then these models force longer-term
correlations to be low as well. Such speci¯cations also force the correlation ½RM ;RL between the return to
the market portfolio and the return to human capital (which equals the sum of current labor income and
the unobservable \capital gain" to human capital) to be low.
In contrast to these papers, we specify aggregate labor income to be cointegrated with dividends.3 Such
a speci¯cation is consistent with empirically observed low contemporaneous correlations ½RM ;L between
market returns and changes to aggregate labor income °ow. However, this speci¯cation permits correlations
½RM ;RL between returns to human capital and market returns to be signi¯cantly higher.
The notion that returns to human capital and market returns should be highly correlated is not
new. For example, Baxter and Jerman (1997, BJ) test for the existence of cointegration by using data on
aggregate employee compensation and GDP growth (in contrast to using dividends on the market portfolio,
as we do in this paper). Although they only ¯nd weak statistical evidence in support of cointegration,
as is often the case in tests of cointegration, they proceed under the economically plausible assumption
that such a relation exists and investigate the implications for international portfolio choice. Assuming
a constant discount rate, they ¯nd that the present values of capital income and labor income exhibit
a high correlation, in excess of 90%. Using a very di®erent argument, Campbell (1996) also reports a
high correlation between human capital and market returns. In particular, he assumes that labor income
follows an AR(1) process and has low contemporaneous correlation with stock dividends. However, he
assumes that the same (highly time-varying) discount factor should be used to discount both labor income
2Several other contributions investigate the implications of human capital for asset pricing and portfolio choice. For
instance, Merton (1971), Svensson and Werner (1993), and Koo (1998) study portfolio choice in the presence of nontraded
labor income. Bodie et al. (2004), Chan and Viceira (2000), and Dybvig and Liu (2004) examine the portfolio choice problem
in economies with °exible labor supply or voluntary retirement. Telmer (1993) investigates the variability of the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution in an incomplete market economy with uninsurable labor income shocks. Heaton and Lucas
(1996) and Lucas (1994) study the equity premium in economies with aggregate and idiosyncratic labor income shocks,
transaction costs, as well as borrowing and short-sales constraints.
3Many other recent papers have assumed that labor income and dividend °ows are cointegrated. See, for example, Santos
and Veronesi (2006) and Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004).3
and dividends. In his model, the high correlation between human capital and market returns is e®ectively
due to the common and highly varying discount factor.4
In this paper, we investigate the implication of cointegration between aggregate labor income and
dividends on the market portfolio for life-cycle portfolio choice. Although related to the work of BJ,
our analysis di®ers signi¯cantly from theirs in many respects. First, they consider an in¯nitely-lived
representative agent who has a claim to aggregate labor income. Thus, their analysis does not generate
implications for the life-cycle behavior of ¯nitely lived individual agents. Second, their analysis ignores the
fact that individual agents face signi¯cant idiosyncratic labor income shocks (see, for example, Carroll and
Samwick (1997, CS), CGM, and Gourinchas and Parker (2002, GP)) that are not captured by looking at
aggregate averages alone. Third, they do not solve for the optimal portfolio choice. Rather, they focus on
the one-period return of an investor who seeks a world value-weighted (i.e., diversi¯ed) portfolio. Finally,
they estimate human capital by exogenously setting the discount rate that is used to discount labor income
to a constant.
In contrast, we investigate the optimal portfolio and consumption choices over the life cycle for an agent
with constant relative risk aversion who earns nontradable labor income. The agent's labor income has two
components. The ¯rst component is aggregate labor income, which itself is speci¯ed to be cointegrated
with the dividend process. The second component captures both life-cycle predictability (i.e., labor income
tends to increase with age when the agent is young, and then tends to decline as the agent approaches
retirement) and idiosyncratic labor income shocks. Combined, these two components are calibrated to be
consistent with the results of CCGM and CGM. We use a dynamic programming approach to solve for
the consumption and portfolio allocation rules. We also report the present value of labor income for the
optimizing agent by discounting future labor income at her marginal utility.
Contrary to both conventional wisdom and much of the previous literature, and consistent with em-
pirical evidence, our model predicts that the optimal portfolio strategy over the life cycle is hump-shaped.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The inverse of the mean reversion coe±cient controlling the
cointegration, 1
·, provides a time scale for the agent. If the number of years of remaining employment
is larger than this time scale (i.e., if the agent is young), then the return on the agent's human capital
is highly exposed to market returns. Furthermore, most of the young agent's wealth is tied up in future
labor income. Thus, she will ¯nd herself overexposed to market risk, in which case it will be optimal for
her to take a short position in the market portfolio. As the agent ages, however, the cointegration between
labor income and dividends has less time to act. As such, for older agents the present value of future labor
income progressively acquires bond-like properties. Hence, as we move forward in time, the agent places
a larger fraction of her ¯nancial wealth into the risky asset to o®set the larger implicit bond position she
has through her labor income wealth.
As the agent approaches retirement, however, there are two partially o®setting e®ects. First, for short
4Other papers that investigate a link between aggregate labor income and asset prices include Mayers (1974), Fama and
Schwert (1977), Black (1995), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), and Santos and Veronesi (2006).4
times-to-retirement, cointegration does not have su±cient time to act. Thus, human capital takes on
bond-like features, as in, for example, BMS, CGM, CCGM, and GM. Second, the residual value of future
labor income shrinks, since the agent has fewer years left to work, and therefore the value of the bond
position implicit in her human capital decreases. Eventually, this second e®ect prevails, in which case the
agent starts to reduce her stock holdings to buy more of the risk-free asset. This switch creates a hump
in her investment strategy, and explains the downward-sloping part of her life-cycle pro¯le. Just prior to
retirement, the present value of future labor income for the agent is zero, and hence the optimal portfolio
decision approaches the Merton (1969) solution (which ignores labor income).
As mentioned previously, the main determinant of the peak location in the hump-shaped portfoilio
holdings is the time scale of the cointegration. Based on this factor alone, we expect the peak to occur
approximately 1
· years before retirement. Hence, for our baseline case of · = 0:15, portfolio holdings
should peak approximately 6.6 years before retirement. The results we ¯nd below are remarkably close to
this prediction, especially since other factors (such as the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk) are expected to
play a role in the location of the peak.
Note that several previous studies also propose models in which young agents do not participate in the
stock market. However, this result typically obtains by assuming a sizeable entry cost (see, for example,
Abel (2001), CGM, and GM). We emphasize that our prediction follows without assuming any entry costs.
Further, as we demonstrate below, the qualitative conclusions of our ¯ndings are very robust across a wide
range of parameter inputs.
In support of our model, we ¯nd evidence that aggregate labor income and dividends on the market
portfolio are cointegrated. Speci¯cally, by using data from 1929 to 2004, we reject the unit root (i.e.,
· = 0) hypothesis at reasonable signi¯cance levels. We acknowledge we cannot reject the unit root
assumption with typical signi¯cance levels using only post World War II data. As is well known, however,
it is econometrically very di±cult to distinguish between these two hypotheses, as unit root tests are
notorious for lacking power. Still, we consider an investigation of the implication of such a cointegrated
relation for life-cycle portfolio choice a worthwhile endeavor for several reasons. First, cointegration is
assumed by most macroeconomic models.5 Second, cointegration is economically plausible. Indeed, as BJ
point out, if labor and capital income were to have independent trends, then the ratio of labor income
to capital income would either grow without bound or approach zero asymptotically, and the labor share
would approach either zero or one; these implications seem implausible. Third, our model speci¯cation
reduces to traditional models (i.e., no cointegration) in the limit · ! 0. Econometrically, it is di±cult to
distinguish between · = 0 and, say, · = 0:05 given only a few decades of data. Indeed, for · = 0:05, we
only expect to see the e®ects of cointegration over a time frame of 1
0:05 ¼ 20 years, implying that with 60
years of data, we only have about 60
20 ¼ 3 independent data points. Yet, as we show below, the models
with · = 0 or · = 0:05 generate signi¯cantly di®erent predictions for the optimal portfolio decision of a
5For instance, a model with a Cobb-Douglas production function predicts that returns to physical and human capital are
perfectly correlated even in the short run.5
young agent.6 Since these two models are di±cult to distinguish econometrically, it seems important to
investigate the implications of both.
Our results hold for reasonable levels of the agent's risk aversion coe±cient. Following CCGM, CGM,
and Gomes and Michaelides (2005, GM), we choose ° = 5 for our baseline case. Qualitatively similar
results obtain if we set ° = 4. However, a less risk-averse agent (for example, ° = 3) ¯nds it optimal
to invest heavily in stocks in spite of the long-run cointegration e®ect. Hence, we ¯nd that even small
di®erences in relative risk aversion can generate substantially di®erent predictions. This result is consistent
with empirical observation that asset holdings and stock market participation exhibit a high degree of
heterogeneity. In contrast, most models that do not account for this long-run cointegration conclude that
young agents over a wide range of risk aversion levels should hold a large proportion of their ¯nancial
wealth in risky securities.
Finally, we extend our analysis to account for return predictability. Intuitively, the fact that low current
returns generate higher future expected returns implies that stock ownership creates its own hedge, making
stocks even more desirable than when it is assumed that returns are i.i.d. Even so, our main conclusions
remain qualitatively unchanged. That is, we still ¯nd that, assuming reasonable parameter estimates for
expected returns and risk-aversion coe±cients, young agents should short the market even in the presence
of stock return predictability.
The recent literature o®ers many alternative explanations for the limited stock market participation
puzzle.7 The explanation we o®er here, while di®erent, can be viewed as complementary to these. In par-
ticular, our paper emphasizes that long-run cointegration between aggregate labor income and aggregate
dividends has a ¯rst-order e®ect on the optimal portfolio decisions of an agent over the life cycle.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the life-cycle portfolio choice
model. In Section II, we generalize the model to account for stock return predictability. We explain
the details of the model calibration in Section III. In Section IV we determine optimal portfolio and
consumption choice by numerically solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Sensitivity analysis
suggests that the main qualitative result is robust to a wide range of parameter calibrations. We conclude
6In some respects, this is analogous to the approach of Bansal and Yaron (2004), who show that consumption dynamics
with small but persistent drifts are econometrically di±cult to distinguish from i.i.d. consumption dynamics, but generate
signi¯cantly di®erent risk premia.
7See, for example, Abel (2001), Curcuru et al. (2004), Davis, Kubler and Willen (2005), Faig and Shum (2002), GM, Guo
(2004), Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Hong et al. (2004), Hsu (2003), Lynch and Tan (2006), and Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2001). Among these studies, those that are most closely related to ours are Lynch and Tan (2006) and Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2001), who examine the implications of time variation in the moments of the labor income dynamics.
They ¯nd that predictability of labor income growth at the business cycle frequency can generate negative hedging demand
for stocks and therefore more realistic stock holdings implications.
8In a recent paper, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) attribute the residuals of consumption growth innovations that
cannot be explained by their model to news about expected future returns on human wealth, and conclude that stock and
labor income returns are negatively correlated. Interestingly, this ¯nding would appear to deepen the limited stock market
participation puzzle, since it implies that optimal holdings of the risky portfolio for the young agent would be even larger
than the levels obtained when it is assumed that labor income is bond-like.6
in Section V.
I. A Model with Cointegrated Dividends and Labor Income
Let the dividend process D(t) of the risky asset follow a geometric Brownian motion, that is,
dD
D
= gD dt + ¾ dz3: (1)







dt + ¾ dz3: (2)
Further, let the dynamics of the economy's pricing kernel ¤(t) have a constant risk free rate r and constant
price of risk ¸,9
d¤
¤
= ¡rdt ¡ ¸dz3: (3)







As is well known, the solution to this expectation is
P(t) =
D(t)
r + ¸¾ ¡ gD
: (5)
Hence, this economy supports a constant dividend yield ± ´
D(t)
P(t):
± = r + ¸¾ ¡ gD: (6)




= gD dt + ¾ dz3: (7)







= ¹dt + ¾ dz3 ; (8)
where we de¯ne the expected return as ¹ ´ (r + ¸¾). Note from equation (6) that ¹ = ± + gD. De¯ning







dt + ¾ dz3: (9)
9Below, we will introduce other Brownian motions that a®ect aggregate quantities. As such, it is likely that such Brownian
motions belong in our pricing kernel. We emphasize, however, that including these into the pricing kernel has no e®ect on
our results.7
We note that this simple model predicts the counterfactual result that the volatility of the dividend
growth rate, ¾, is identical to the stock return volatility. We emphasize, however, that only the stock
return volatility is relevant for the agent's portfolio decision. As such, we ¯x ¾ to match historical stock
return volatility in our calibration below.
For what follows, it will be useful to note that if we integrate equations (2) and (9), we ¯nd that for
all dates t,
^ d(t) = s(t) + ^ d(0) ¡ s(0) ¡ (¹ ¡ gD)t
= s(t) + ^ d(0) ¡ s(0) ¡ ±t: (10)
Next, we specify the dynamics for the labor income process. De¯ne the current labor income °ow for
an individual as L(t). It is convenient to introduce log-labor as `(t) = logL(t). Since CCGM, CGM, CS,
and GP ¯nd idiosyncratic labor shocks to be proportional to the level of labor income, it follows that an
individual's income is a product of two numbers: L1(t), the aggregate income associated with this agent's
career choice, and L2(t), her idiosyncratic shocks. As such, her log-labor °ow is a sum of these two factors,
that is,
`(t) = `1(t) + `2(t); (11)
where `1(t) = logL1(t) and `2(t) = logL2(t).
We now need to specify the dynamics for `1(t) and `2(t). We choose the process for the aggregate state
variable `1(t) such that it captures two features. First, consistent with observation, contemporaneous
correlations between market returns and aggregate shocks to labor income are low. Second, consistent
with Santos and Veronesi (2006) and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004), aggregate labor income and
aggregate dividends are cointegrated. In particular, de¯ne the di®erence between the logs of these two
variables as y(t):
y(t) ´ `1(t) ¡ ^ d(t) ¡ `d: (12)
The constant `d should be interpreted as the long-run log-ratio of aggregate labor income to dividends.
Note that if we use equation (10) to replace ^ d(t), and if we choose (without loss of generality) s(0) ´
`d + ^ d(0), we can rewrite equation (12) as
y(t) = `1(t) ¡ s(t) + ±t: (13)
This equivalent de¯nition will be useful when we account for stock return predictability in the next section.
To capture the notion of cointegration (i.e., long-run dependence) between labor income and dividends,
we assume that y(t) is a mean-reverting process,
dy(t) = ¡·y(t)dt + º1 dz1(t) ¡ º3 dz3(t); (14)
where z1 is a standard Brownian motion independent of z3.8









dt + º2 dz2;i(t); (15)
where z2;i is a standard Brownian motion independent of both z1 and z3. The subscript i is used to
emphasize that this shock is idiosyncratic, in contrast to the aggregate shocks z1 and z3. That is, we follow
CCGM, CGM, CS, GP, and many others and assume that the idiosyncratic labor income component is
subject to permanent shocks. Further, we introduce time dependence in the drift in (15) to capture the
¯nding in the literature that the drift of an individual's labor income is a function of her age. Speci¯cally,
we choose
®(t) = ®0 + ®1t; (16)
where ®0 and ®1 are calibrated to capture the hump shape of earnings over the life cycle (see, for example,
CGM and CS).
From equations (11) and (12), and using Ito's lemma, we can write
`(t) = y(t) + ^ d(t) + `d + `2(t) (17)
d`(t) =
µ








dt + º1 dz1(t) + º2 dz2;i(t) + (¾ ¡ º3) dz3(t): (18)
Since z1 and z2;i are orthogonal to the stock return shock z3, equations (9) and (18) imply that the contem-





Thus, in the special case (¾ ¡ º3) = 0, labor income is contemporaneously uncorrelated with market
returns. We use this case as our benchmark case to emphasize that short-term correlations are unneces-
sary for generating labor income dynamics that are `stock-like'. Instead, what is crucial is the long-term
cointegration.
















dt + º1 dz1(t) + º2 dz2;i(t) + (¾ ¡ º3) dz3(t):
Note that in previous studies, most authors specify the labor process in levels rather than in changes.
Furthermore, it is common to specify the model in discrete time rather than continuous time. It can be
shown, however, that in the limit · ! 0, our speci¯cation is nearly identical to these standard models.
A. Empirical Motivation for the Labor Income Model
As mentioned previously, the speci¯cation (15) for the idiosyncratic labor income component `2 is
consistent with the evidence in earlier studies that examine the properties of labor income at the micro
level. As such, here we focus on providing empirical motivation for the dynamics of the aggregate labor
income component `1, and in particular for the cointegration in equation (14).9
To construct a proxy for `1, we use Lettau and Ludvigson's (2001a, 2001b) de¯nition for labor in-
come, which is, in short, the sum of wages and salaries, transfer payments, and employer contributions
for employee pension and insurance, net of employee contributions for social insurance and taxes.10 We
use yearly data from 1929 to 2004 to form the total labor income series (the data are from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis). To compute
a per capita measure of labor income, we divide the total labor income series by the population measure
reported in the NIPA tables. Finally, we de°ate the per capita labor income series by using the season-
ally adjusted personal consumption expenditures (PCE) de°ator (1992=100) released by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
Following the approach of Fama and French (1988b), we construct a proxy for the aggregate log-
dividend process ^ d. We obtain monthly dividend series from returns, with and without dividends, on the
value-weighted market index released by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We de°ate the
dividend series by the PCE. Finally, to avoid the seasonal di®erences in dividend payments, we construct
yearly dividend series by summing the 12 monthly dividends paid out during each calendar year from 1929
to 2004.
We perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check whether the variable y = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d is
stationary. Speci¯cally, we estimate the ADF regression model
¢y(t) = »1 + »2t + »3y(t ¡ 1) +
L X
j=1
©j ¢y(t ¡ j) + ²(t); (19)
where ¢y(t) = y(t) ¡ y(t ¡ 1), y = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d, by ordinary least squares (OLS).
The results are in Table I below. The ¯rst two rows of the table report results for a unit root test
under the assumption that the error terms ²(t) in equation (19) are serially uncorrelated (i.e., L = 0). In
the ¯rst row, the »2 coe±cient is ¯xed at zero, while in the second row we allow for the presence of a time
trend, as is customary to do in unit root tests. The 10% asymptotic critical values for these Dickey-Fuller
tests are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively (see, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), p. 708). As
such, we ¯nd some evidence against the unit root hypothesis for the 1929 to 2004 sample period (in the
L = »2 = 0 case, the ¿ statistic is -2.77, which compares favorably with the 10% asymptotic critical value,
-2.57). However, we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for the 1947 to 2004 sample period.
Because the assumption of zero correlation in the regression error terms is most likely untenable, in
the third row of Table I we report ADF test results for the case in which the regression model contains the
lagged term ¢y(t¡1), which is equivalent to allowing for ¯rst-order autocorrelation in the error term of the
Dickey-Fuller regression model. Interestingly, the R2 for this regression improves considerably, which lends
support to this model extension. Further, the ADF ¿ statistic is -4.16 for the 1929 to 2004 sample period.
As such, we can reject the unit root hypothesis at a reasonable con¯dence level (the 2.5% asymptotic
critical value is -4.08). This ¯nding is robust to incorporating a second-order lagged term, ¢y(t ¡ 2),
10This de¯nition re°ects the 2003 revision of the NIPA data series by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. More details are
available from Martin Lettau's web page at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/»mlettau/.10
which we ¯nd to be insigni¯cant. We note, however, that these results are not robust to the choice of the
sample period. Speci¯cally, we still cannot reject the unit root hypothesis when we use post-World War
II data.
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE.
In sum, we ¯nd evidence suggesting that log-aggregate labor income, `1, and log-dividend, ^ d, are
cointegrated, consistent with our model equation (14). We acknowledge that this result is not robust to
the choice of sample period. However, the cointegration e®ect can act at very low frequencies. For small
values of ·, it might take many decades for an agent's wages to catch up with the performance of the
economy. Thus, given the relatively short post-World War II sample period it is not surprising that this
e®ect might go undetected by the ADF test, which is notorious for its lack of power.11 Further, economic
intuition provides strong support for the notion that labor and capital income are cointegrated. Therefore,
we proceed under the assumption that the variable y is stationary.
Finally, comparing equation (14) and equation (19), we see that the estimates for the »3 coe±cient
reported in the ¯rst two rows of Table I yield a measure for the speed of the mean-reversion coe±cient,
·, in equation (14). Speci¯cally, after we account for the transformation from discrete time to continuous
time, we ¯nd that · = ¡log(1+»3). If we rely on the post-World War II sample period, we ¯nd that this
coe±cient is as small as · = ¡log(1 ¡ 0:0464) = 0:0475. If, instead, we rely on the (more informative)
1929 to 2004 full sample period and we allow for the presence of a time trend in the regression model, we
obtain a value as large as · = ¡log(1 ¡ 0:1855) = 0:2052: Below, we will use this evidence in choosing a
range for the · coe±cient in our calibration exercise.
B. The Agent
The current ¯nancial wealth of the agent is placed in two securities, with a proportion ¼ placed in the
risky asset and (1 ¡ ¼(t)) placed in the risk-free asset. As such, her wealth dynamics follow























+ L(t)dt + ¯W(t)dz4;i(t): (20)
The last term captures the notion of transient shocks to the agent's wealth. In contrast to most discrete
time models, it is simpler in our continuous time model to capture these transient shocks in the wealth
process rather than in the labor income process. Consistent with intuition, and the numerical results of
CGM, we report below that this term has a negligible e®ect on the agent's consumption and portfolio
choices for a wide range of reasonable parameter estimates for ¯.
11BJ use the same ADF approach to test whether the ratio of labor income to capital income is a stationary random
variable. They use annual data on labor and capital income for Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
from 1960 to 1993. For each of the four countries they consider, they cannot reject the unit root hypothesis (our results for
the post-World War II period based on U.S. dividend and labor income data are similar to those that BJ report in their
unpublished Appendix).11












dt + ¼(t)¾ dz3(t) + ¯ dz4;i(t): (21)
We assume that the agent has standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. As












Note that we do not explicitly model the post-retirement consumption and investment decision of the
agent. Instead, in our application below we calibrate the bequest function to capture the retirement-years
consumption that the agent wants to save for (an approach similar to that of GP). This is equivalent to
modeling the post-retirement consumption and investment decisions under the assumption that the agent
receives a ¯xed income °ow like, for example, a retirement annuity. After retirement, the agent's problem
simpli¯es to a version of the Merton model, which does not a®ect the pre-retirement solution.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is (dropping time arguments to simplify notation)
0 = e¡ÃtC1¡°
1 ¡ °
+ Jt + WJW
µ
















































+ WLJWL (¾ ¡ º3)¼¾ ¡ º3¾¼WJWy + LJLy
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1 ¡ º3 (¾ ¡ º3)
¢
:
The ¯rst-order conditions for the two controls are
0 = e¡ÃtC¡° ¡ JW (24)
0 = WJW (¹ ¡ r) + W2JWW¾2¼ + WLJWL¾ (¾ ¡ º3) ¡ º3¾WJWy; (25)







WJW(¹ ¡ r) + WLJWL¾ (¾ ¡ º3) ¡ º3¾WJWy
W2JWW¾2 : (27)
Note that equation (26) provides a simple mapping between consumption C and JW. Below, we take ad-
vantage of this relation by performing our numerical analysis using C (and its partial derivatives) rather
than J. This improves the stability of the numerics as can be understood by noting that equation (27) im-
plies that the proportion of wealth placed into the risky asset must be estimated from numerical estimates
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That is, we can determine ¼ by using only the ¯rst derivatives of C.
As is well known, the CRRA utility function possesses a scaling feature, which allows us to eliminate
one of the state variables. In particular, for any value of ¸ we can write
C(¸W;¸L;y;t) = ¸C(W;L;y;t): (29)
Intuitively, this states that if an agent were twice as rich and had twice the labor income, then she would
optimally choose to consume twice as much. If we choose ¸ = 1








For what follows, it is convenient to de¯ne X ´ L
W and c(X = L
W ;y;t) ´ C(1; L
W ;y;t). Thus, we can








Using standard rules to change variables, we ¯nd that the optimal portfolio decision can be written in



















The ¯rst term is the well-known result from Merton (1969). The other terms capture the e®ects of
stochastic labor income and cointegration. For the case in which there is no cointegration (i.e., · = 0), it
is straightforward to show that cy = 0 and hence the last term drops out.12
Note that it might be di±cult for an agent to sell securities short. Thus, following GM, Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2001), and many others, we impose the constraint that ¼ lies within the ¼min = 0 and
¼max = 1 bounds. In Section IV, we relax this constraint and allow the agent to take short positions up
to 100% of her ¯nancial wealth, i.e., ¼min = ¡1 and ¼max = 2.
Just as we use equation (26) to rewrite the ¯rst-order condition on ¼, we use this equation to rewrite
the Bellman equation. In particular, we ¯rst di®erentiate the HJB equation with respect to W, using the
envelope condition to simplify the equation. A change of variables then gives





(r ¡ Ã)c ¡
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r + ¼(¹ ¡ r) + X ¡ c + ¯2¢






X2cXX ¡ (° + 1)c¡1 (c ¡ XcX)
2
i
+ ¼¾ (¾ ¡ º3)(1 + °)XcX
12Further, note that for the special case in which ¹ ¡ r = °¾
2 and º3 = 0, we ¯nd ¼(t) = 1. In that case, the agent invests
100% of her wealth in risky assets irrespective of the correlation between labor income and stock returns, which is driven by
º1;º2! This is a very speci¯c case, where absent any labor income investors would want to invest everything in the stock
market (the Merton portfolio is (¹ ¡ r)=(°¾
2) = 1). With º3 = 0 we can think of labor income as giving the agent a random
number (determined by º1;º2) of shares of stock|the agent has no incentive to deviate from his position. Alternatively, we
can think in terms of the two e®ects on the agent's risky asset holding decision that play a role when increasing exposure to
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:
The terminal condition is
c(X;y;T) = ²¡1 8(X;y): (34)
C. Present Value of Labor Income
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to consumption for the HJB equation yields13
JW = UC = e¡±t C¡° : (35)
Thus, the time-t present value of the agent's labor income is











Below, we estimate the present value to labor income in equation (36) by using the Monte Carlo method.
Given that Vt is a function of only three state variables, namely, y, L, and W, we can write the
stochastic component of dV as





dz1 + º2LVL dz2;i
+
¡
¡º3Vy + (¾ ¡ º3)LVL + ¼¾WVW
¢
dz3 + ¯WVW dz4;i :
Although there are no traded securities that correlate with the z1, z2;i, and z4;i sources of risk, as a thought
experiment, consider three \pseudo-securities" Xj, j = 1;2, and 4, such that
dXj(t)
Xj(t)






dt + ¾dzj;i(t); j = 1;2; and 4:
The coe±cients ¸j(t); j = 1; 2, and 4, are the risk premia on these pseudo-securities.14 We note that if all
these claims were traded, then these risk premia would be pinned down by the observable price processes.
13In Section I.B, we impose short-selling constraints. Note, however, that such constraints do not a®ect the ¯rst-order
condition with respect to consumption for the HJB equation. As such, discounting at JW is still identical to discounting at
UC, which yields equation (36). Of course, the ¯rst-order condition with respect to the portfolio holding ¼ and the optimal
value of consumption will be a®ected by the presence of short-selling constraints. We impose these constraints numerically
when solving for the optimal investment ¼ and consumption C.
14For simplicity, we assume these securities pay no dividends and we normalize their di®usion coe±cients to be constant
(equal to ¾). This ensures that the securities span all sources of risk.14
In that case markets would be complete and the portfolio problem would have a simple solution (for
example, Du±e (2001)). It is well known that when markets are incomplete, the portfolio problem can be
characterized by a complete markets problem in a ¯ctitiously completed market in which the risk premia
of the added securities are such that, at the optimum, the agent does not want to hold them (He and
Pearson (1991), Karatzas et al. (1991)). The corresponding risk premia, given the optimal value function,




















We then consider a replicating portfolio consisting of an investment µS in the stock S, µB in the risk-free
asset B, and µXj in Xj, j = 1;2; and 4:
V Rep = µSS + µBB + µX1X1 + µX2X2 + µX4X4 : (40)
The stochastic component of dV Rep is
dV Rep
stochastic = µSS¾dz3 + µX1X1¾dz1 + µX2X2¾dz2;i + µX4X4¾dz4;i: (41)
Thus, by matching coe±cients in (37) and (41) we conclude that the proportion of the agent's human




¡º3Vy + (¾ ¡ º3)LVL + ¼¾WVW
¾ V
: (42)
Finally, we determine the correlation coe±cient between returns to human capital and stock returns, which
we denote by ½. By combining (9) with (37), we obtain
½ =




V = (º1Vy + º1LVL)2 + (º2LVL)2 + (¡º3Vy + (¾ ¡ º3)LVL + ¼¾WVW)2 + (¯WVW)2.
In Section IV, we evaluate (36), (42), and (43) for reasonable model coe±cients, and we illustrate the
e®ect of cointegration between the labor market and the stock market on the agent's human capital.
II. Accounting for Predictability in Returns
It is well documented that there is long-run predictability in stock returns. The fact that low returns
generate higher future expected returns implies that stock ownership creates its own hedge, making stocks
even more desirable than when it is assumed that returns are i.i.d.. An equivalent way to convey this
intuition is to note that predictability lowers the return variance per unit time over longer horizons,
even though the unconditional equity premium is unchanged. Below, we investigate whether our ¯ndings
regarding optimal stock holdings are robust when long-run return predictability is taken into account.15
First, we document that the variable y de¯ned in equation (14) is successful at predicting future stock
returns. In fact, we ¯nd that its predictive power is similar to that of the dividend yield|a variable that
is often used in the literature (see, for example, Cochrane (2005)) to capture asset return predictability.
We therefore extend the model to account for this predictability in stock returns.15
A. Empirical Motivation for the Model with Return Predictability
We consider the regression model
s(t + h) ¡ s(t)
h
= ¯0 + ¯1 »(t) + ²(t + h); (44)
where h denotes the predictability horizon (h = 1;:::;5 years). The dependent variable is the cumulative
return (inclusive of distributions) on the CRSP value-weighted market index.16 As in Fama and French
(1988b), the annual cumulative returns are non overlapping. The two- to ¯ve-year returns are overlapping
annual (end-of-year) observations. The data are from 1929 to 2004.
In Table II, we report estimation results for several di®erent predictive variables. In the ¯rst case, the
predictive variable is the (logarithmic) dividend yield, that is, »(t) = ^ d(t)¡p(t¡1), with p(t) ´ log(P(t)).
In this case, the series of dividends D is constructed as discussed previously in Section A, while P is the
level of the CRSP value-weighted market index. Next, we consider two di®erent measures of the variable
y and we explore their predictive power towards equity index returns. The ¯rst measure relies on the
de¯nition in equation (12), that is, y(t) = `1(t) ¡ ^ d(t) ¡ `d. Here, the per capita aggregate labor income
`1(t) is computed according to the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a, 2001b) de¯nition, as explained in Section
A. The second measure of y relies on the de¯nition in equation (13), that is, y(t) = `1(t) ¡ s(t) + ±t. In
this latter case, s is the log-level of the CRSP value-weighted market index, inclusive of all distributions,
and ± is the sample average of the yearly dividend yield from 1929 to 2004.
The main ¯nding is that the variable y has considerable power in explaining future equity index returns.
The best results are obtained when y is measured as in equation (13). Speci¯cally, the R2 coe±cient for
the regressions that use y = `1 ¡ s + ±t as a predictive variable is higher than the R2 of the regressions
that use the dividend yield as a predictive variable. The explanatory power of the y variable measured as
`1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d is somewhat lower, but still non negligible.
In sum, this evidence motivates the choice of using y to capture return predictability in our analysis
of the portfolio choice problem over the life cycle.
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE.
15The fact that we can capture the predictability in stock returns with the same variable y used to model cointegration
between dividend and labor income is related to recent empirical evidence in Santos and Veronesi (2006) and Julliard (2005).
This approach allows us to incorporate predictability in stock returns in the model without expanding the number of state
variables. This is a signi¯cant computational advantage given the di±culty in solving higher-order nonlinear di®erential
equations.
16We de°ate the nominal index value by using the by using the seasonally adjusted personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) de°ator (1992=100) released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.16
B. Modeling Predictability
Recall from equations (13) and (14) that we have
y(t) = `1(t) ¡ s(t) + ±t: (45)
dy(t) = ¡·y(t)dt + º1 dz1(t) ¡ º3 dz3(t): (46)








dt + ¾ dz3(t); (47)
where the parameter Á captures the strength of the predictability. Integrating equation (47), we ¯nd














































is the same as in the no-
predictability model. In contrast, the variance per unit time, which equals ¾2 for all maturities in the
no-predictability case, decreases with time in this model, as we demonstrate in Figure 1 below.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Analogous to equation (18) and the equations that follow, we have
d`(t) =
µ








dt + º1 dz1(t) + º2 dz2;i(t) + (¾ ¡ º3) dz3(t): (50)
Equation (50) implies that `(t) is normally distributed. Its mean and variance are, respectively,



























































When we set º2 = 0 in equation (52), we obtain the variance of the aggregate labor income component,
Var0 [`1(T)]. Figure 1 depicts Var0 [`1(T)]=T for di®erent values of the Á coe±cient and as a function of the
investment horizon T. The plots illustrate that due to the cointegration relation, the variance of the growth
rates in the logarithmic gain process and aggregate labor income terms converge as the investment horizon
T increases. Further, with predictability the variance of these growth rates are reduced signi¯cantly in
the long run.17
Normality implies that E0 [L(T)] = eE0[`(T)]+1
2Var0[`(T)]: We use this formula to choose f®0; ®1g to best
















dt + º1 dz1(t) + º2 dz2;i(t) + (¾ ¡ º3) dz3(t):
Following the same argument as in the previous section, we ¯nd that the change-of-variable HJB equation
is nearly the same as in equation (33):
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:
From the ¯rst order condition, the optimal proportion invested in the risky asset is
¼ =
¹ + Áy ¡ r
°¾2 +
µ














The terminal condition is
c(X;y;T) = ²¡1 8(X;y): (55)
III. Model Calibration
To illustrate the implications of our model, we consider a realistic calibration of its coe±cients.
1. Labor Income Dynamics
The parameter · is the key cointegration coe±cient that links aggregate labor income `1 and divi-
dends ^ d, in that it determines the speed of the mean reversion of the variable y towards its long-run
mean. In Section I.A, we ¯nd evidence that · is imprecisely measured and varies considerably de-
pending on the sample period, with point estimates that range from approximately 0.05 to over 0.20.
As such, below we use · = 0:15 for our baseline case. We check the robustness of our simulation
results when · takes values at the lower (· = 0:05) and upper bounds (· = 0:20) of its empirical
range.
The variance of the total labor income process is determined by three coe±cients, º1, º2, and º3.
Of these, º3 captures the short-run correlation between labor income and returns innovations. As




2+(¾¡º3)2. In our baseline case, we
¯x º3 = ¾ = 0:16, which yields a zero contemporaneous correlation between labor income growth
and stock market returns. A low correlation is consistent with the empirical evidence reported in,18
for example, CGM, Davis and Willen (2000), and Fama and Schwert (1977). In the next section we
illustrate the robustness of our results to di®erent values of this coe±cient.
The coe±cient º2 determines the variance of the idiosyncratic labor income component, `2. We
calibrate º2 to match the magnitude of the typical permanent income component's variance, as
measured in previous studies that model the labor income process of individual households by using
micro data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). For instance, CGM report values for
the standard deviations of the permanent idiosyncratic shocks that range from 0.1 to 0.13, depending
on the household's education level. CS and GP's estimates range from 0.11 to 0.21, depending on
the household's occupation and education level. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) document
that the conditional standard deviation of the permanent shocks increases from 0.12 to 0.21 as the
economy moves from peak to trough. As such, in our baseline case we set º2 = 0:15.
Finally, to illustrate the calibration of the º1 coe±cient, it is worth noting that from equation (18)
the total variance of the labor income process is º2
1 + (¾ ¡ º3)2 + º2
2. This total variance can be
decomposed into aggregate, º2
1 + (¾ ¡ º3)2, and idiosyncratic, º2
2, components. In our baseline case,
the idiosyncratic component is º2
2 = 0:0225. As such, we choose º1 so that the ratio of aggregate
to permanent idiosyncratic variance shocks is very small (on the order of 1-to-10), consistent with
the evidence in CCGM. Speci¯cally, we ¯x º1 = 0:05, which implies that in the baseline case the
aggregate variance component equals º2
1 + (¾ ¡ º3)2 = 0:0025. In section IV, we document that
a larger value of º2, which implies an even smaller ratio of aggregate to permanent idiosyncratic
variance shocks, also yields qualitatively similar risky asset holdings.
2. Deterministic Life-Cycle Labor Income Pro¯le
We calibrate the coe±cients in the drift term ®(t) in (15) to reproduce the typical income pattern
due to the predictable growth component described in CS. We consider a twenty-year-old college-
educated agent, t = 0, who will work until her retirement date at age 65, T = 45. We assume that
her t = 0 annual labor income is $15,000 in 1992 USD and we set ®0 = 0:0581 and ®1 = ¡0:0024,
which imply the deterministic labor income pro¯le depicted in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
3. Transitory Income Shocks
The transitory income component documented in CGM, CS, GP, and others is built into our model
through the term proportional to dz4;i in the wealth dynamics (20). For our baseline case, we ¯x
¯ = 0:02, which implies that most transient °uctuations are within §2¯, that is, §4%, of the
current value of wealth. Thus, for an average wealth of, say, $300,000, most transient shocks will be
within §$12;000 per year, with a typical yearly shock of §$6;000, consistent with the results of, for
example, CGM.
4. Risky Asset and Riskfree Bond19
Consistent with Mehra and Prescott (1985), we ¯x the real risk-free interest rate at 1% and we
assume a 6% risk premium for the risky asset investment, that is, r = 1% and ¹ = 7% in real terms.
As we will show later, lower estimates of the risk premium make our results stronger, in that optimal
stock holdings are even lower. Further, we calibrate the ¾ coe±cient to match the sample standard
deviation of stock returns, ¾ = 16%, and we set gD to match the average growth rate in dividends,
gD = 1:8%.
As for stock return predictability, below we compute life-cycle portfolio holdings for both the cases
in which Á = 0 (that is, i.i.d. returns) and Á > 0. Fama and French (1988a) show that return
predictability accounts for around 25% of the variance of the three to ¯ve-year return on the CRSP
value-weighted market index. When we ¯x the model coe±cients to their baseline value and Á = 0:08,
equation (49) yields that the three-year return variance is reduced by approximately 24% compared
to the i.i.d. case, while the ¯ve-year return variance drops by nearly 40% (this result is illustrated
in Figure 1 above). This analysis is also consistent with the empirical evidence discussed in Section
A. Speci¯cally, at the ¯ve-year horizon, the estimates of the regression coe±cient ¯1, which links
the cumulative per year return to the predictive variable y, ranges from about 0.07 to approximately
0.09, depending on how y is measured. The value Á = 0:08 falls in the middle of this empirical range.
Below, we also compute life-cycle portfolio holdings for values of Á as high as 0:1. When Á = 0:1,
the three-year return variance is reduced by approximately 31% and the ¯ve-year return variance
by nearly 52%, compared to the i.i.d. case. Such variance decay is approximately twice as high as
that documented in Fama and French (1988a). Further, Á = 0:1 is higher than the upper end of the
empirical range found in our univariate predictability regressions at the ¯ve-year horizon. For all
these reasons, this high value of Á should over estimate the degree of predictability in stock returns
and therefore provide a useful benchmark to check the robustness of our results.
5. Preferences
The critical parameter in the CRRA utility function is the risk aversion coe±cient °. Mehra and
Prescott (1985) argue that reasonable values of ° are smaller than 10. As in CCGM, CGM, and GM,
we use ° = 5 for our baseline case. In the next section, we document the sensitivity of our results to
di®erent ° values.
The magnitude of the remaining coe±cients in the value function (22) is less controversial. Following
CCGM, CGM, and GM, we ¯x ± = 0.04. Cagetti (2003), Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002), and
Hurd (1989) examine the implications of a bequest motive on lifetime saving and consumption
decisions. In our application, we follow an approach similar to that of GP and do not explicitly
model the agent's behavior during her retirement years. In this case, ² determines the number of
years of retirement consumption that the investor wants to save for. Accordingly, we calibrate ²
to generate a wealth accumulation pro¯le over the life cycle that is consistent with the evidence
documented in, for example, Cagetti (2003), for college-educated households. This approach results20
in ² = 8.
6. Initial Conditions
We consider a twenty-year-old agent endowed with $5,000 of cash-on-hand in 1992 USD, that is,
W(0) = 5. As mentioned previously, the agent's t = 0 annual labor income is $15,000 in 1992
USD, that is, L(0) = 15. We ¯x y(0) at its \steady state" most likely value, that is, y(0) = 0, and
without loss of generality we initialize the logarithm of the stock market gain process at zero, that
is, s(0) = 0.
IV. Simulation Results
With the exception of a few special cases,17 analytic solutions for the life-cycle portfolio choice problem
are typically not available. As such, we solve our problem numerically, by using standard ¯nite-di®erence
methods; see, for example, Ames (1977) and Candler (1999).
Here, we only sketch the numerical solution approach. More details are available in Appendix A. We
solve the consumption problem (33) backwards, starting from the time T = 45 terminal condition (34)
and going all the way back to the initial date t=0. At each tenth of a year, we save the values of c and
¼ on an X- and y-grid. To obtain representative wealth, consumption, investment, and X pro¯les, we
simulate 200,000 W, L, y, and X paths from their dynamics at the frequency of one-tenth of a year. In
the simulations, we ¯x the controls ¼ and c at the values obtained by interpolating our ¼ and c solutions
on the points of the X- and y-grid. Then, we average the realizations of the W, C, ¼, and X paths.
Finally, we use analytic solutions for Et[ys] and Et[Ls], t · s · T to determine the representative y and
L life-cycle patterns.
A. Baseline Case
In Figure 3, Panel A, we report the representative life-cycle wealth, consumption, and labor income pro-
¯les that result from our baseline calibration of the model. As expected, accumulated wealth increases over
the life of the agent, and her consumption grows proportionally. Further, the representative individual's
labor income pro¯le exhibits the typical pattern identi¯ed by, for example, CGM for a college-educated
household.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.
Most interestingly, Panel B of Figure 3 depicts the representative stock holdings, ¼, over the life cycle.
Contrary to the ¯ndings of much of the previous literature, and consistent with empirical evidence, we ¯nd
that a young agent should not invest in the risky asset. However, as the agent ages, the optimal proportion
of wealth in risky stocks increases. Intuitively, the inverse of the mean reversion coe±cient controlling
17Among recent studies, see, for example, Du±e et al. (1997), Liu and Loewenstein (2002), Liu, Longsta® and Pan (2003),
Schroder and Skiadas (2003, 2005).21
the cointegration provides a time scale for the agent. If the number of years of remaining employment is
larger than this time scale (that is, if the agent is young), then the return on the agent's human capital
is highly exposed to market returns. Furthermore, most of the young agent's wealth is tied up in future
labor income. As such, she will ¯nd herself overexposed to market risk, in which case it will be optimal for
her to short the market portfolio, analogous to the in¯nitely lived representative agent in BJ who faces no
idiosyncratic labor shocks. Since we impose short-sale constraints, the agent chooses to invest her entire
liquid wealth in the risk-free bond. If, instead, the number of years of remaining employment is smaller
than this time scale (that is, if she is middle aged), then the return on her human capital is not highly
exposed to market returns|that is, her future labor income is more bond-like than stock-like. As such,
she will ¯nd it optimal to invest more in the risky asset than a young agent.
When the agent approaches retirement, however, we observe two partially o®setting e®ects. First,
for short times-to-retirement the cointegration e®ect does not have su±cient time to act. Thus, as in
BMS, CGM, CCGM, and GM, human capital becomes bond-like. Second, the residual value of future
labor income shrinks, since the agent has fewer years left to work, and therefore the value of the bond
position implicit in her human capital decreases. For su±ciently short times-to-retirement, this second
e®ect prevails, and the agent starts to reduce her stock holdings in order to buy more of the risk-free
asset. This switch creates a hump in her investment strategy, and explains the downward-sloping part of
her life-cycle pro¯le. Just before retirement, the present value of future labor income for the agent is zero,
and therefore the optimal portfolio decision approaches the Merton (1969) solution (which ignores labor
income).
As mentioned previously, the time scale of the cointegration is the main determinant of the peak
location in portfolio holdings. Based on this factor alone, we expect the peak to occur approximately
1
· years before retirement. Hence, for our baseline case of · = 0:15, we expect portfolio holdings to
peak approximately 6.6 years before retirement. The peak in portfolio holdings depicted in Panel B
occurs around that age. This is remarkable, especially because other factors (such as the magnitude of
idiosyncratic risk) are expected to play a role in the location of the peak. This result is also roughly
consistent with previous empirical studies, that ¯nd life-cycle portfolio holdings peak around age 50 to
60.18
18A vast literature studies the link between age and risky asset holdings. The evidence is often mixed, partly because of
the well-known identi¯cation problem that makes it impossible to disentangle age e®ects, time e®ects, and cohort (that is,
birth year) e®ects on portfolio choice. Several studies set cohort e®ects to zero. For instance, Campbell (2006) follows this
approach to study the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data. He estimates coe±cients on age and squared-age,
which imply that portfolio holdings peak when the agent is in her late ¯fties. Similarly, when using SCF data from 1989 to
1998 and setting cohort e®ects to zero, Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) ¯nd that portfolio holdings peak when the agent is in her
early ¯fties.22
B. Human Capital
We use equation (36) to compute the value of a twenty-year-old agent's human capital. Following the
same method discussed previously, we simulate 500,000 wealth and consumption paths and we average
across these simulated paths to evaluate (36). For a twenty-year-old agent, in the baseline case this
approach results in a present value of labor income, V , of approximately $178,000. Further, we numerically
di®erentiate V with respect to y, L, and W, and use our estimates of Vy, VL, and VW to compute the
fraction of the agent's human capital tied up in the stock market, as illustrated in (42). We ¯nd this fraction
to be approximately one-half.19 At ¯rst blush, this fraction might not seem high enough to generate our
¯ndings, since the optimal retired agent holds about that much in stock, in which case it would seem that
the agent's implicit holdings match her desired holdings, and therefore with her remaining cash-on-hand
she should also invest about half of it in the risky asset. However, this estimate does not account for her
implicit holdings in the three pseudo-securities X1, X2, and X4 introduced in Section I.C. Figure 4 below
shows the decomposition of the replicating portfolio for human capital into its various holdings of stock,
pseudo-securities, and the risk-free money market. We ¯nd that the positions in X1, X2, and X4 implicit
in the agent's human capital are 13.9%, 87.6%, and 0.4%, respectively. Clearly, human capital is mostly
equivalent to a long position in the stock market portfolio and in permanent idiosyncratic risk, which is
hedged with X2. The transient idiosyncratic shocks driven by z4 and hedged with X4 represent only a very
small fraction of the replicating portfolio. Hence, they do not a®ect the shadow value of labor income very
much. We emphasize that the pseudo-securities' risk-premia are determined endogenously such that, given
their labor income, agents do not want to trade in these securities.20 Interestingly, through her human
capital the agent's implicit holding in the risk-free asset is approximately -51%. That is, the agent's
present value of labor income is a very leveraged security. On the other hand, for an agent approaching
retirement human capital becomes small. Thus, her position in these pseudo-securities approaches zero,
which explains her long position in the stock market.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.
Related, we measure the correlation of stock returns and the returns to human capital. Using equation
(43), for a twenty-year-old agent we ¯nd a correlation coe±cient of ½ » = 50%. That is, due to the idiosyn-
cratic labor income shocks, the correlation is much lower than what is found by BJ and Campbell (1996)
at the aggregate level. Still, it is su±ciently high to have a ¯rst-order e®ect on the agent's portfolio choice
decisions.
Finally, in Figure 5, Panel A, we illustrate how the agent's human capital evolves over the life cycle.
For values of t from 0 to 45, we use (36) to compute the present value of the future stream of labor income,
19Lucas (2005) studies how ¯rms should value and hedge de¯ned-bene¯ts pension plan obligations when earnings growth
and stock returns are positively correlated over long horizons. Consistent with our ¯ndings, she concludes that a large share
of a hedge portfolio for active workers would be invested in stocks, with the share in stocks declining as employees age.
20An alternative interpretation is the following. Suppose the agent had no labor income, but instead could invest in these
pseudo-securities (with risk premia as determined above). Then she would want to invest precisely in the portfolio represented
in Figure 4.23
Vt. We note that the fraction of the agent's labor income tied up in the risky asset is roughly constant at
50% throughout the ¯rst half of her life, and it rapidly goes to zero as she approaches retirement. Further,
we note that the present value of human capital has a hump-shaped pro¯le. That is, although young
agents face a larger stream of future labor income, they discount such cash °ows more than older agents.
This occurs for three reasons. First, the predictable labor income component has a hump-shaped pro¯le.
As such, when the agent is young, higher labor income cash °ows occur at older ages, and therefore are
subject to greater time discounting. Second, as the agent ages, she faces lower idiosyncratic labor income
risk. To validate this intuition, we use equation (39) to compute the risk premium on the permanent
idiosyncratic labor income shocks over the agent's life cycle. We ¯nd that ¸2 has a downward-sloping
pro¯le. It is approximately 7% when the agent is young, and it approaches zero when the agent retires.
This e®ect is common to other models with idiosyncratic labor income risk, for example, CCGM, CGM,
CS, and GM, among others. Third, in our model human capital has pronounced stock-like features, and
thus commands a higher discount rate, for young agents, whereas it acquires bond-like properties, and
thus is discounted at a lower rate, for older agents. Due to this third e®ect, which is determined by the
long-run cointegration of labor income and stock market performance, the value of human capital peaks at
a later point in the agent's life compared to standard models considered in previous studies. This intuition
is con¯rmed by the evidence in Figure 5, Panel B, which shows that the correlation of stock returns and
the returns to human capital remains high and basically constant over the ¯rst half of the agent's life, and
it rapidly drops as the agent approaches retirement.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE.
C. Robustness of Results
Here we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in parameter estimates. We ¯nd that quali-
tatively similar results hold for a substantial range of parameter estimates.
C.1. Speed of Mean Reversion and the Equity Premium
In Figure 6, we explore the robustness of our results to the magnitude of the · coe±cient. Consistent
with the intuition discussed in Section A, we see that larger values of · increase the agent's exposure to
stock market risk and thus reduce her stock holdings. However, even a small value of · has ¯rst-order
e®ects on the life-cycle ¼ pro¯le.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE.
CCGM, CGM, and GM set the equity premium equal to 4%, a value that is motivated based on the
observation that stock prices have tended to increase relative to corporate earnings over recent years.
Thus, in Figure 7 we illustrate the life-cycle ¼ pro¯le when r = 1% and ¹ = 5%. Interestingly, a lower
value of the equity premium makes our results even stronger. Speci¯cally, it is worth noting that with
this model calibration a young agent chooses not to invest in the stock market even if the · coe±cient is
as low as 0.05, as compared to the · = 0:15 of the baseline case.24
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE.
C.2. Contemporaneous Correlation of Stock Returns and Aggregate Labor Income Shocks
We noted previously that our baseline calibration implies a zero contemporaneous correlation of stock
returns and growth rates in labor income. In Figure 8, we illustrate the e®ect of non zero contemporaneous
correlations. We consider two cases, º3 = 0:18 and 0.14, which imply correlations of approximately §13%,
respectively. Consistent with previous studies, we note that even such high values of correlations have
limited impact on the agent's stock holdings, compared to the long-run cointegration e®ect.
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE.
C.3. Persistent Idiosyncratic Labor Income Shocks
We note that an increase in the idiosyncratic labor income variance (through an increase in º2) has two
possibly opposite e®ects on the investor's desired portfolio holdings. First, it increases background risk,
which all else equal leads to a decrease in desired risky asset holdings. Second, it provides a diversi¯cation
motive, which might induce the agent to increase her demand for the risky asset. The latter e®ect could
potentially counter balance the e®ect due to the long-run cointegration-like behavior of the aggregate labor
income with the market portfolio. In Figure 9, we show that a value of º2 as high as 0.20 (the upper end
of the empirical range documented in the literature) attenuates but does not eliminate our main result.
Interestingly, the picture shows that investors with an investment horizon of approximately 12 years are
in fact indi®erent to a change in º2. This duration-like feature may be due to a near perfect o®setting of
the two e®ects (diversi¯cation motive vs. background risk) noted above.
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE.
C.4. Transitory Idiosyncratic Labor Income Shocks
It is generally agreed that transient idiosyncratic labor income shocks have negligible implications for
the optimal portfolio choice problem solution. We con¯rm this result by considering values of ¯ as small
as zero and as large as 0.04 (twice the value used in our baseline case). In either case, we ¯nd life-cycle
portfolio holdings that are nearly identical to those obtained in the baseline case (not reported).
C.5. Relative Risk Aversion
In Figure 10, we document the sensitivity of our results to changes in the relative risk aversion coe±-
cient. Note that even for a young agent with relative risk aversion of ° = 4, human capital has stock-like
features. In this case, stock holdings retain the same hump-shaped pro¯le over the life cycle. However, a
less risk-averse agent (for example, ° = 3) perceives her human capital to be more bond-like, in spite of
the long-run cointegration e®ect. Hence, even at a young age she invests heavily in the risky asset. As she
gets older, the present value of her human capital declines relative to the value of her liquid wealth. Thus,25
we see her ¼ pro¯le decline as she approaches retirement. As such, consistent with empirical evidence our
model exhibits a high degree of heterogeneity in stock market participation even for small di®erences in
the risk aversion coe±cient.
INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE.
C.6. Short-Sale Constraints
The recent development of derivatives markets as well as the proliferation of Exchange Traded Funds
(ETFs) makes it easier for an agent to take short positions in the market portfolio. Thus, in Figure 11
we illustrate the typical life-cycle investment pro¯le when the short-sale constraint is relaxed. Consistent
with the intuition developed in Sections IV.A and IV.B, we ¯nd that a young agent chooses to short the
market portfolio to hedge the long position in the stock market implicit in her human capital.
INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE.
C.7. Predictability
Figure 12 illustrates the e®ect of return predictability on the agent's life-cycle portfolio holdings. We
focus on the case in which the equity premium is 4%, a value that is also frequently used in the literature
(see, for example, CCGM, CGM, and GM). In Panel A, we ¯x the predictability coe±cient at the baseline
value Á = 0:08. As anticipated, predictability creates a hedging demand for the risky asset, which makes
the agent more willing to invest in the stock market. Speci¯cally, in the ° = 5 baseline case, the young
investor chooses to allocate her entire ¯nancial wealth in the risky asset. As the investor ages, her risky
asset holding converges to the Merton solution. However, if we increase the coe±cient of risk aversion
to ° = 7:5 (a value that is still considered acceptable in the literature),21 we ¯nd that the e®ect of
cointegration between the stock and labor markets is su±ciently powerful to o®set the hedging demand
due to return predictability. That is, the young agent chooses to sell the market portfolio short to hedge
the risk associated with her human capital position.
INSERT FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE. In Panel B, we ¯x the coe±cient of relative risk aversion at
° = 7:5 and we illustrate the sensitivity of life-cycle portfolio holdings to di®erent values of the predictabil-
ity coe±cient Á. Clearly, as we decrease Á the agent's risky asset holdings converge to those found in the
case of i.i.d. returns. Further, we note that for su±ciently high values of Á the hedging demand for the
risky asset dominates and the young agent chooses to invest all her ¯nancial wealth in the stock market.
We note, however, that an economically plausible model calibration that features higher values of the ·
coe±cient, possibly in combination with a lower variance of the idiosyncratic labor income shocks captured
by the º2 coe±cient and a higher risk aversion coe±cient °, would reverse this result (not reported). In
conclusion, even in the presence of return predictability we can identify a variety of economically plausible
calibrations that are consistent with the behavior of many young agents who choose to invest little or no
wealth in the stock market. 21Mehra and Prescott (1985) restrict the value of ° to be a maximum of ten. Bansal and Yaron (2004) use ° = 7:5 and
° = 10 in their analysis of the equity premium.26
V. Conclusions
Conventional wisdom maintains that young investors should invest heavily in the stock market. Most
theoretical investigations concur. Furthermore, most models suggest that labor income is more bond-like
than stock-like, implying that even higher optimal proportions of wealth should be placed into holdings
of the risky asset if labor income is taken into account. In this paper, we consider a model in which the
aggregate component of an agent's labor income is cointegrated with the dividend process on the market
portfolio, while the individual labor income component is subject to signi¯cant permanent idiosyncratic
shocks. In contrast to much of the previous literature, we ¯nd that the optimal portfolio choice for the
young investor is to take a substantial short position in the risky portfolio. This occurs because in our
model the value of the claim to labor income is e®ectively a highly leveraged security with large implicit
exposure to the market portfolio. Our main ¯ndings are robust to a wide array of economically plausible
calibrations and are qualitatively unchanged when we allow for the presence of predictability in the risky
asset's return.
One obvious extension of our paper is to include housing.22 Quan and Titman (1997) ¯nd that the real
estate market is cointegrated with the stock market. This evidence suggests that if one were to incorporate
housing into the portfolio choice problem and model this cointegration, the optimal investment in stocks
would become even more negative.
Although this paper focuses on the individual's optimal portfolio and consumption choices taking the
risk premium of the market as given, our ¯ndings might have important implications for general equilibrium
models that attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle.23 Indeed, as Basak and Cuoco (1998) point
out, by taking as given that a large proportion of investors do not participate in the stock market, one
need only attribute reasonable levels of risk aversion to those agents that do invest in stocks in order to
explain the historical equity premium. Our results indicate that it is optimal for a large proportion of
agents in the economy to short, or at least not participate, in the equity market. Thus, the exogenous
speci¯cation of Basak and Cuoco (1998) might be justi¯able in a general equilibrium setting that considers
two classes of agents that endogenously choose to participate in the stock market depending on their risk
aversion and long-run exposures to aggregate risk.24
Further, since we ¯nd that in the presence of cointegration the investment horizon has a dramatic
impact on portfolio holdings, it would be interesting to explore within an equilibrium model the interaction
22Several recent studies investigate the implications of real estate holdings for asset pricing. See, for example, Cocco (2005),
Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Fugazza et al. (2006), Hu (2005), Davido® (2006), and Yao and Zhang (2005).
23Related work includes Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Polkovnichenko (2004), Vissing-J¿rgensen (2002), Guvenen (2004), and
Vissing-J¿rgensen and Attanasio (2003). Although not directly related, Bansal and Yaron (2004) investigate how long-run
AR(1) processes for earnings °ow can explain historical equity premiums.
24More speci¯cally, the fraction of human capital implicitly tied up in the stock market might vary by occupation. This
e®ect, which is captured by di®erent values of the · coe±cient in our model, has a signi¯cant impact on portfolio holdings.
Further, we demonstrate above that small di®erences in risk aversion can also yield heterogeneity in stock market participation
in our model.27
of various cohorts or overlapping generations of households whose labor income is cointegrated with long-
term market performance.25 Within this setting, it would be interesting to examine the e®ect of possible
changes to the Social Security system, for example, the possibility of moving to a privatized retirement
system in which retirement contributions earn market-based rates of return (see, for example, Abel (2001)
and CCGM).
Finally, our model suggests that labor income arti¯cially generates a negative net supply of risk-free
securities. This prediction contrasts with the typical approach of assuming that the risk-free security is in
zero net supply. We save these interesting questions for future research.
Appendix A: Numerical Solution Approach
We solve the optimal portfolio and consumption problem (32), (33), and (34) by using the alternate
direction implicit (ADI) ¯nite-di®erence method (see, for example, Ames (1977)). Following Candler
(1999), we treat the nonlinear terms in (33) explicitly, thus reducing the problem to a sequence of tri-
diagonal systems of linear equations that can be solved easily using standard numerical methods.26
As noted previously, via some transformations we are able to reduce the state space from four state
variables to two, namely, X and y. We evaluate the solution on a discrete state-space grid. For y, we set
the lower bound of the domain at ymin = y0 ¡ 5¾(y), and the upper bound at ymax = y0 + 5¾(y), where




3)=2·. We then construct the y-grid with a ¢y = 0:05 mesh. For X, we use
Xmin = 0 and Xmax = 10, and construct the corresponding X-grid using a ¢X = 0:05 mesh.
We solve the problem backwards, starting from the time T = 45 terminal condition (34) and going all
the way back to the initial date t = 0. We use a time step ¢t = 0:001, which is further broken down into
time increments of length ¢t=2 in each of the two steps of the ADI algorithm.
We note that our numerical approach is robust to the choice of the time- and space-grid parameters. For
instance, we have veri¯ed that setting xmax = 20, ymin = y0 ¡7¾(y), ymax = y0 +7¾(y), and ¢t = 0:0005
results in the same numerical solution for c and ¼.
The boundary conditions are treated as follows. First, we note that at Xmin = 0 labor income is zero.
Thus, when returns are i.i.d. the Merton (1969) closed-form solution for optimal consumption holds and
provides an exact boundary condition, which we impose in our ¯nite-di®erence approach. When returns
are predictable, as modeled in Section II, there is no closed-form solution for optimal consumption.27
Thus, when returns are predictable we impose the condition
@3c(X;y)
@X3 = 0; X = Xmin: Further, we note
that the second derivative of consumption with respect to the X state variable vanishes as X increases.
25For related work, see, for example, Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), Guvenen (2004), and Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2001).
26We test our numerical approach in the special case of the Merton (1969) model, for which a closed-form solution is known.
In that case, the approximation error generated by the numerical solution method for the agent's consumption/investment
policies is nearly zero.
27A closed-form solution for optimal consumption is available in the special case in which intermediate consumption is zero
(see, for example, Kim and Omberg (1996) and Liu (2005)) or under the condition of complete markets (see, for example, Liu
(2005)). Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is satis¯ed in our application.28
Thus, we impose the condition
@2c(X;y)
@X2 = 0; X = Xmax: (56)
Economic intuition does not o®er exact boundary conditions at ymin and ymax. After some experi-
mentation, we ¯nd that the third derivative of consumption with respect to the variable y vanishes as y
approaches the boundaries of its domain. Thus, we impose the conditions
@3c(X;y)
@y3 = 0; y = ymin and y = ymax: (57)
We check the robustness of the solution to this approach by extending the range of the y-domain, ¯nding
identical results. Further, we note that using a discretization of (33) that relies only on internal points at
ymin and ymax yields results identical to those obtained by imposing the boundary condition (57).29
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Table I
ADF Test Results
We estimate the model
¢y(t) = »1 + »2t + »3y(t ¡ 1) +
L X
j=1
©j ¢y(t ¡ j) + ²(t);
where ¢y(t) ´ y(t) ¡ y(t ¡ 1) and y = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d. The proxy for `1 is computed using Lettau and
Ludvigson's (2001a, 2001b) de¯nition for labor income. We use yearly data from 1929 to 2004 to form the
total labor income series (the data are from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis). We then divide the total labor income series by the
population measure reported in the NIPA tables. Finally, we de°ate the per capita labor income series by
using the seasonally adjusted personal consumption expenditures (PCE) de°ator (1992=100) released by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The proxy for the aggregate log-dividend process ^ d is constructed from return data on the value-weighted
market index released by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We de°ate the dividend
series by the PCE. Finally, to avoid the seasonal di®erences in dividend payments, we construct yearly




Adj: »3 ¿ R2
Adj:
L = 0, »2 = 0 -0.1097 -2.77 8.29% -0.0464 -1.15 0.58%
L = 0 -0.1855 -2.86 9.72% -0.1401 -1.93 3.00%
L = 1 -0.2645 -4.16 24.04% -0.1731 -2.44 17.77%
L = 2 -0.2397 -3.33 22.34% -0.1697 -2.20 14.35%37
Table II
Return Predictability Regressions
We estimate the model
s(t + h) ¡ s(t)
h
= ¯0 + ¯1 »(t) + ²(t + h);
where h denotes the predictability horizon (h = 1;:::;5 years). The dependent variable is the real
cumulative return (inclusive of distributions) on the CRSP value-weighted market index. The annual
cumulative returns are nonoverlapping. The two- to ¯ve-year returns are overlapping annual (end-of-year)
observations. The ¯rst predictive variable is »(t) = ^ d(t)¡p(t¡1), that is, the logarithmic dividend yield.
The other predictive variables are two di®erent measures of the variable y, as given in equations (13) and
(14). They are »(t) = `1(t) ¡ ^ d(t) ¡ `d and »(t) = y(t) = `1(t) ¡ s(t) + ±t; where ± is the average yearly
dividend yield. The sample period is 1929 to 2004. Standard errors estimates are robust with respect to
both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticy. Coe±cient t-ratios are in square brackets.
h = 1 year
Predictive variable:
¯0 [t-ratio] ¯1 [t-ratio] R2
Adj:
» = ^ d ¡ p 0.3026 [ 1.89 ] 0.0738 [ 1.48 ] 1.26%
» = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d 0.0601 [ 2.96 ] 0.1460 [ 1.52 ] 3.51%
» = `1 ¡ s + ±t 0.0740 [ 3.55 ] 0.1400 [ 2.49 ] 6.51%
h = 2 years
» = ^ d ¡ p 0.3274 [ 2.33 ] 0.0817 [ 1.82 ] 4.66%
» = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d 0.0602 [ 3.10 ] 0.1322 [ 1.45 ] 6.19%
» = `1 ¡ s + ±t 0.0733 [ 3.88 ] 0.1381 [ 2.71 ] 13.43%
h = 3 years
» = ^ d ¡ p 0.3225 [ 2.62 ] 0.0798 [ 2.00 ] 7.30%
» = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d 0.0633 [ 3.60 ] 0.1106 [ 1.44 ] 7.06%
» = `1 ¡ s + ±t 0.0736 [ 4.32 ] 0.1212 [ 2.74 ] 17.12%
h = 4 years
» = ^ d ¡ p 0.3281 [ 2.80 ] 0.0806 [ 2.09 ] 10.07%
» = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d 0.0678 [ 4.34 ] 0.0871 [ 1.60 ] 6.19%
» = `1 ¡ s + ±t 0.0756 [ 4.91 ] 0.1076 [ 2.97 ] 19.54%
h = 5 years
» = ^ d ¡ p 0.3164 [ 2.55 ] 0.0764 [ 1.87 ] 11.59%
» = `1 ¡ ^ d ¡ `d 0.0712 [ 4.95 ] 0.0709 [ 1.74 ] 6.06%
» = `1 ¡ s + ±t 0.0766 [ 5.57 ] 0.0925 [ 3.16 ] 20.68%38
















Figure 1. Return and aggregate labor income variance per unit time. The plots depict the
variance of the risky asset's return inclusive of distributions and the variance of the aggregate labor
income component, both measured per unit time, for di®erent values of the Á coe±cient and as a function
of the investment horizon T. The continuous (|) and dashed (- -) lines depict Var0 [s(T)]=T for Á = 0
and Á = 0:08, respectively. The plots marked with stars (***) and dots (...) depict Var0 [`1(T)]=T for
Á = 0 and Á = 0:08, respectively. When Á = 0, returns are i.i.d., while a positive value of Á (for example,
Á = 0:08) captures the e®ect of return predictability. The other model coe±cients are ¯xed at the baseline
values discussed in Section III below.




























Figure 2. Deterministic labor income pro¯le. The plot depicts the life-cycle deterministic labor
income pro¯le that results from our calibration of the ®(t) term in (15). The agent enters the job market
at age 20, earning an annual income of $15,000 in 1992 USD, and retires at age 65.39























Panel A: Wealth, consumption, and labor income in 1992 USD











Panel B: Stock holdings
Figure 3. Wealth, consumption, labor income, and stock holdings pro¯les. The plots depict the
life-cycle pro¯les of wealth, consumption, labor income, and stock holdings for the baseline case parameters.







































Figure 4. The components of human capital. The histogram depicts the investments in the various
securities (risky asset S, pseudo-securities Xj, j = 1;2, and 4, and risk-free money market B) that replicate
the long position in human capital (that is, the present value of future labor income °ows).40



























PV Labor Income in Stock
Panel A: Present value of labor income and present value of labor income tied up in stock












Panel B: Correlation of stock returns and returns to human capital
Figure 5. Human capital. The properties of human capital for the baseline case parameters.












κ = 0.15 (baseline)
κ = 0.20
Figure 6. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to the · coe±cient.41











µ − r = 4%; κ = 0.05
µ − r = 4%; κ = 0.10
µ − r = 4%; κ = 0.15
µ − r = 6%; κ = 0.15 (baseline)
Figure 7. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to the · coe±cient and the risk premium.














3 = 0.16 (baseline)
ν
3 = 0.14
Figure 8. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to the º3 coe±cient.














2 = 0.15 (baseline)
ν
2 = 0.10
Figure 9. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to the º2 coe±cient.42
















γ = 5 (baseline)
Figure 10. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to the relative risk aversion coe±cient °.













min = 0; π
max = 1 (baseline)
π
min = −0.5; π
max = 1.5
π
min = −1; π
max = 2
Figure 11. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. Sensitivity to short-sale constraints.43

















Panel A: Sensitivity to the risk aversion coe±cient, °. The return predictability coe±cient is Á = 0:08.

















Panel B: Sensitivity to the risk aversion coe±cient, Á. The risk aversion coe±cient is ° = 7:5.
Figure 12. Life-cycle pro¯les of stock holdings. The plots depict life-cycle stock holdings when the
stock market's return is predictable. In both panels, the risk premium is ¹ ¡ r = 4%, while the other
model coe±cients are ¯xed at their baseline values.1 
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